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  1 
Institutions and Organisations 
  Defining exactly what we mean by ‘institutional change’ is not always easy.  
Advocates of the need for institutional change in contemporary Japan invariably mean 
organisational change, a change in the system, although inherent in that call is a 
recognition of the need to change the way that people think about things, and go about 
doing them.  In much of the current literature the terms ‘institution’ and ‘organisation’ 
tend to be used interchangeably, in a way that does indeed accord with the 
considerable identity between the way that people think and behave, and the way that 
they structure and organise their activities.  History, as Paul David has noted, matters 
profoundly to the evolution of both organisations and institutions, although it is the 
institutions that are the ‘carriers of history’, as the effectiveness of the larger 
organisation is shaped by factors such as mutually consistent expectations, shared 
information channels and codes, and collectively recognised constraints (David 1994).  
It is unlikely to be valid, therefore, for an empirically minded economic historian to 
seek to divorce the analysis of institutions from the study of the organisations that are 
their historical manifestation, and which mediate their impact on longer term 
historical development.  Like the problematic attempts to analyse the role of ‘culture’ 
in economic development, the historical analysis of institutions and institutional 
change can only really be undertaken by looking at outcomes. 
This paper embraces this broader understanding of ‘institutional change’.   It 
takes as its starting point North’s definition of institutions as the formal and informal 
‘rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction [and]…structure incentives in human exchange, whether 
political, social or economic’ (North 1990:3).  However, it also aims to explore the 
formal structures that were shaped by these formal and informal rules, articulated by 
Johnson as ‘formal institutions’ (Johnson 1992:26) or by North and others as 
‘organisations’.  In North’s words again, ‘organizations and their entrepreneurs 
engage in purposive activity and in that role are the agents of, and shape the direction 
of, institutional change’ (North 1990:73). 
Identifying the sources of institutional change is not easy.  It is apparent, 
however, that the process of change and adaptation is contingent on a capacity to 
acquire new knowledge and information, and the making of innovations on the basis 
of that new knowledge. In that sense change can be associated with a process of 
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change’ its institutional framework (Johnson 1992:24).  Identifying the sources of 
organisational change has proved somewhat less elusive.  As Fruin has observed, 
‘organizations can and do learn, from others and from themselves’ (Fruin 1992:63).  
Through its capacity to ‘collect and understand inside and outside information and 
address problems properly on the basis of acquired knowledge’ (Suzuki 2002:4), an 
organisation goes beyond being a simple agent of institutional change, taking on a 
particular evolutionary path dictated in line with its own imperatives.  This process of 
‘organisational learning’ has been explored in Douglas’ work (Douglas 1985), and 
lies at the core of Westney’s study of organisational transfer in Meiji Japan (Westney 
1987).  What is important in both institutional and organisational learning, though, are 
the human agents of change.  Any more concrete analysis of the possibilities or 
process of change needs to consider who might be the agents of change, why they 
might seek to bring it about and what might constrain or promote its success. 
  The experience of institutional and organisational change of Meiji Japan 
highlights a number of factors of considerable relevance to contemporary debates, but 
care needs to be taken in drawing any clear analogy across a time span of well over a 
century. Firstly, as historians of technology emphasize, there are major differences 
between incremental changes on the same trajectory and a shift to a completely new 
trajectory. While many would argue in the early 21
st century that some Japanese 
organisations or institutions should shift to a new trajectory, it would be unrealistic to 
expect a trajectory shift on the scale that faced late 19
th century Japan.  Secondly, 
innovation and learning are a social process, and the possibilities are conditioned by 
institutions such as property rights or the norms of distribution (Johnson 1992: 36).  In 
that respect institutions can provide the stability needed for change, impede it, or 
promote it.  Since human behaviour is inherent in institutions and organisations, 
borrowing them from elsewhere is inherently complicated and difficulty.  Finally, 
there is the importance of what has been called the ‘institutional cluster’, in which 
‘each new component that is added must be adapted to interlock with elements of the 
pre-existing structure’.  The consequence is a favouring of stasis and incremental 
change, and a tendency to respond conservatively to dysfunctional aspects in the 
existing system (David 1994:215).  To put it a different way, ‘inertia is a basic feature 
of institutions’ (Johnson 1992:26). 
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of the Meiji experience of particular relevance to the current situation.  The first is the 
extent to which there may have been particular pressures that pushed towards 
effective institutional change in the late 19
th-early 20
th centuries.  It will be argued that 
contemporary change may prove more difficult in the absence of these, or equivalent, 
pressures.  The second is the fact that institutional change which with benefit of 
hindsight appears both rapid and effective is often at the time perceived as both slow 
and difficult.    One of the most important of these is the role that can be played by the 
government.  The historical record suggests that while organisational change can be 
relatively abrupt, it is far harder to discern discontinuity in institutions.  Ways of 
doing things and thinking about things do not change overnight, although sudden 
shifts in the environment or circumstances can generate relatively rapid institutional 
change.  For the most part institutional change is a continuous, dynamic process, 
characterised by both continuities and discontinuities.  It is only by retaining that 
understanding of institutional change as process that organisational and legislative 
changes currently proposed for the Japanese economy and polity can be properly 
embedded in a way that will lead to their being effective.  Thirdly, the Meiji 
experience demonstrates the fluctuating nature of the relationship between 
government initiatives, legislation and regulation, and institutional and organisational 
change.  We need to ask, for example, how far it lies within the capacity of the law-
making authorities to pave the way for institutional change, and how far efforts that 
are too far out of tune with the force of public opinion and publicly recognised need 
are doomed to failure or, at the best, a lukewarm measure of success.  Is institutional 
redesign, as Cargill suggests in this volume, ultimately a matter of will and political 
leadership?  We need at the same time to consider effective institutions of the kind 
articulated by North may exist without state involvement, indeed, how far such 
institutions may substitute for a regime that under other circumstances might be 
articulated through a central authority.  This might relate, for example, to institutions 
promoting contract enforceability of the kind analysed by Greif (1989, 1993) 
  The paper starts by giving an overview of institutional change in Meiji Japan, 
suggesting that the reality was in many ways rather different from the image that is 
often portrayed.  This overview focuses on the role of the central government, often 
depicted as the key agent in the Meiji transformation.  The central section of the paper 
looks in more detail at the process of institutional and organisational change in three 
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business enterprises, and labour market and the employment system.  Analysis of 
these three areas shows that in all three cases the process of institutional and 
organisational change was slow and sporadic.  The conclusion offers some tentative 
observations on the ‘lessons’ the Meiji period may have for contemporary debates. 
 
The Meiji Transformation: Image and Reality 
  European visitors to Japan in the late nineteenth century were often struck by 
the country’s ‘backwardness’ in relation to the industrialised economies of Western 
Europe or the United States.  By contrast, much of the subsequent historiography 
lauded the rapidity and clarity of a transformation that had established Japan as a 
regional superpower by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, and a 
serious economic competitor to Europe soon after.  In particular, the ‘modernisation’ 
school of historians focussed on internal dynamics as the key to change, and 
established an image of the historical process of change that has left a lasting 
influence.  Japan benefited, it was claimed, from the external pressures for change that 
were imposed upon it.  The clearsighted political leadership that held power in the 
wake of the Meiji Restoration of 1868 was not only intent on preserving its own 
power, but recognised that a failure to bring about substantive change would at best 
lead to economic and political subservience to the Western powers along the lines 
experienced by China, and at worst to Japan’s becoming subject to colonial status.  
The overriding imperative behind change was the need firstly to achieve the ending of 
the extraterritoriality and unequal treaty system imposed in the 1850s, and secondly to 
build up Japan’s political and economic power to bestow equal status with those 
Western industrial powers.  Driven by this stimulus, the members of the ruling elite 
carefully examined the possible alternatives for change, looking closely at Western 
institutions and models, and making judicious choices as to what would best suit the 
Japanese environment.  It was recognised that to some extent the process of change 
built on developments during the Tokugawa period, but the overwhelming emphasis 
was on the across-the-board institutional transformation, much of it along Western 
lines.  For some scholars and for many contemporaries modernisation was, indeed, 
Westernisation.  By the time of the First World War Japan possessed not only 
factories and joint stock companies, but Western style legal infrastructure, 
bureaucracy and political structures.  While the ‘rules of the game’ and the related 
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were also sufficiently different from their Tokugawa predecessors to bring an 
emphasis on discontinuity rather than continuity. 
  It would be a mistake to dismiss this assessment of what was by any standards 
a remarkable period in Japan’s history.  That Japan almost alone in Asia was able to 
offer effective resistance to Western imperialism, and to become in her turn an 
imperialist, testifies to the validity of many of these claims.  If we look more closely 
at this transformation as a process of institutional and organisational change, however, 
our judgement of ‘success’ has perforce to be a rather more muted one.  We may 
argue with benefit of hindsight that on balance the process of institutional change was 
relatively successful, but that does not mean that it was easy at the time, nor that its 
success was at all predictable.  Research by a number of scholars has demonstrated 
that institutional and organisational change in the Meiji period was rarely smooth, and 
in most cases it was several decades before changes became well-established.  The 
early 1870s was devoted in large part to dismantling key elements of the existing 
system.  Establishing a legal and political framework that was recognised by the 
Treaty Powers as justifying the repeal of the unequal treaties took around thirty years, 
and creating the infrastructure for industrial capitalism took considerably longer.  
Even this may have been a remarkable achievement, but it left many areas of Japanese 
life relatively untouched even by 1914. 
Along the way there was a significant process of trial and error.  The Japanese 
leadership was often divided.  While there is no doubt that the external threat was 
often a compelling factor in the imposition of unity, and the revision of the unequal 
treaties a common objective, there was far less agreement on how to achieve this 
ultimate goal.  Friction and disagreements were common, and the political history of 
the Meiji period is characterised by the presence of a number of disenchanted former 
government members whose views could no longer be accommodated within the 
decision-making process.  Nor was the process of change the consequence of a clearly 
thought through line of action.  The extent of information and knowledge possessed 
by all those involved in the process of change was limited, and decision-making at all 
levels from central government on down was undertaken on a pragmatic, day-to-day 
basis.  Some of the institutions and organisations adopted can be seen as failures, and 
were subsequently replaced by other ones that proved more successful. 
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one.  While there were some conspicuously dramatic changes, large areas of national 
life remained relatively untouched.  Elsewhere the changes were much more subtle 
and much longer term, becoming obvious only at a much later date.  This was in 
substantial part due to physical and psychological constraints on what was possible, 
but also to the complex interaction between indigenous and imported institutions in 
the borrowing process.  Many Tokugawa institutions and organisations possessed a 
considerable degree of sophistication.  The level of national market integration was 
already considerable, and in most areas monetisation and commercialisation was a 
fact of life.  Economic actors had become accustomed to the forms of regulation and 
practices that had accompanied market penetration, which were invariably distinct 
from their Western counterparts.  This sophistication of indigenous institutions could 
be both beneficial and disadvantageous for institutional change.  On the one hand, it 
could lay the foundations for further evolution and development.  A peasant farmer 
accustomed to the use of money and to paying tribute in the form of rice to the 
domain lord might find the post-Restoration transition to an obligation to pay rent in 
kind to a landlord or money tax to the state relatively easy.  A commercial elite that 
dealt in futures and had developed advanced accounting practices would not find 
Western commercial practices totally unfamiliar.  In other respects, though, complex 
and well-established indigenous patterns of behaviour and operation might come into 
conflict with Western alternatives.  An emphasis on consensus, collectivity and 
mutual obligation was potentially antagonistic to any emphasis on self-centred 
individualism.  As Weber had suggested (ref.), East Asian societies influenced by the 
Confucian ethic judged behaviour with reference to discharging an expected role in 
society, and not with reference to some extraneous, universal yardstick laid down by 
an all-powerful deity.  Such conflicts had to be tackled by compromise, pragmatism 
and rhetoric.  The analysis of particular areas of national life in the second half of this 
paper will make this very clear. 
 
The Meiji Government and Institutional Change 
  Given the significance of agents of change in any institutional transformation, 
the Meiji government has, not surprisingly, been the focus of much analysis.  Any 
government making a decision that a concerted effort is required to bring about 
institutional change, and then seeking to implement that decision, is faced with two 
  7interrelated tasks.  The first is the need to dismantle or modify existing unwanted 
institutions, removing impediments to industrialisation (Gerschenkron 1962).  The 
second is the establishment and development of new, wanted institutions.  The 
Gerschenkronian paradigm is in many ways appropriate in the case of late 19
th 
century Japan.  The tension between where the country was and where its leaders 
wished it to be was obvious.  The concept of ‘relative backwardness’ is an appropriate 
one for a country in which recognition of an inferior international status became the 
driving force of national policy, although the policies pursued by the regime did not 
necessarily accord with those articulated by Gerschenkron.  The Meiji regime itself 
identified the need for state action to redeem the situation, and accepted the overriding 
responsibility for the achievement of success. 
   In seeking to engineer change the Meiji regime had the support of history.  It 
was an elite government that could build on a strong tradition of intervention in many 
areas of national life, and not least in economic activity.  National and local 
authorities in the Tokugawa period had not contented themselves with political 
dominance and control.  They had also engaged in extensive regulation of and 
intervention in the economy, for example through domain monopolies of production, 
regulation of guilds, and monitoring of the all-important rice market.  While the 
regulation may not always have been effective, the right to intervene was rarely 
questioned.  Indeed, the ethic of mutual responsibility between ruler and ruled even 
made such intervention an obligation.  Providing the new government could 
consolidate its political and military control, therefore, its right to direct change would 
not be fundamentally questioned.  However, as noted above, post-Restoration 
governments were rarely completely united, and while members were brought 
together by a single overriding objective, it was the choices that were made in relation 
both to dismantling old institutions and building new ones that were the main sources 
of conflict.  Friction was generated by both processes, and was articulated with 
particular vehemence in the rebellion of 1877, led by Saigō Takamori, a former 
member of the ruling group, but was also manifest in the political crisis of 1881, with 
the ousting from the regime of Ōkuma Shigenobu and his supporters, as well as the 
popular rights movement of the 1870s and 1880s, and subsequently the small left 
wing movement.  Internal conflict was never far away, and opposition came from 
both within the regime and without, and from both conservative and progressive 
viewpoints. 
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treaty revision would be achieved would be to establish in Japan institutions along 
Western lines that would obtain the confidence of Western powers and their citizens.  
Extraterritoriality would only be ceded once Europeans and Americans believed that 
Japan’s legal system would safeguard their rights and welfare at least as well as the 
one they possessed at home.  In such cases, therefore, Japan had no choice but to 
follow Western practices.  Elsewhere there was less compulsion to copy Western 
practice; the choice to do so was more of a pragmatic response.  However, Western 
practice was never uniform, and the political and economic leadership was faced with 
often difficult choices between Western alternatives. 
While the key criteria for making these choices were what was acceptable to the 
industrialised countries of the West and the extent to which imported practices could 
be accommodated to the reality of Meiji Japan, it is difficult to discern any consistent 
and unifying pattern behind the choices that were made, not least because many 
choices were delegated down from the top level of the regime, or made by individuals 
completely outside it.  The selection of models or institutions to adopt was eclectic 
and often fortuitous, and the lack of complete unanimity in government guaranteed 
the diversity of choice.  Mistakes were made, as will be demonstrated below in the 
case of the financial system. 
  Moreover, the requirement to borrow from outside practices was associated 
with a high degree of ambiguity in the minds of Japan’s leaders. Ideology was 
important.  Even before the Meiji Restoration intellectuals such as Sakuma Shōzan 
had come up with the concept of wakon yōsai, literally Japanese ethic (spirit) and 
Western technology.  For many of the Meiji leaders the superiority of Western 
technology and knowhow was undisputable, but that of Western institutions and 
organisations far more questionable.  In as far as Western institutions dictated the 
power structure of international economic and political relations they would have to 
accept some accommodation, but there was a considerable reluctance to countenance 
any wholesale imposition of a completely different institutional set-up, even in the 
absence of the imperatives of the ‘institutional cluster’ that was likely to render such a 
thing impractical.  Distinguishing between the adoption of Western technologies and 
knowledge and the adoption of Western institutions was, however, often impossible.  
The import of Western technologies invariably involved in addition a degree of 
institutional change.  Mechanised methods of production, for example, gave rise to 
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and telegram system facilitated much more rapid information flow, in turn influencing 
factors as diverse as family relationships, internal migration patterns and market 
responses.  Moreover, the interaction of organisations imported from outside with the 
indigenous Japanese environment could, through a process of organisational learning, 
generate significant deviation from the original model and the indigenous one, in the 
process generating a completely new institutional form (eg. Westney 1987). 
  The overall process was therefore a complex and difficult one, in which the 
chances of long term success were unclear and the leading role of the government 
often ambiguous.  This complex reality will be explored in the remainder of this paper 
by looking at the course of institutional and organisational change in three particular 
areas of the economy that are also at the core of debates over institutional and 
organisational reform in contemporary Japan: financial institutions, business 
institutions and labour market institutions.  They are also areas that demonstrate a 
spectrum in relation to the ability and willingness of government to bring about 
institutional and organisational change.  It must be accepted that the nature of political 
institutions is also at the heart of the contemporary debate, but even a brief discussion 
of political change in Meiji Japan lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Reform of the Financial System 
The financial and fiscal systems of the Tokugawa period were characterised 
by the ability to engage in complex dealings utilising sophisticated financial 
instruments, but in many respects it was incapable of coping either with the revenue 
demands of the new government or the requirements of industrial capitalism.  A major 
weakness with the existing set-up was its dependence on the ancien regime.  Through 
the guild system, through the operation of the rice market, and through lending to the 
governing class, the economic power of the commercial elite was closely associated 
with the pre-1868 status quo.  Already under threat from the fall-out of the opening of 
Japan to international trade, the financial system came under even greater pressure 
around the time of the Restoration.  Extensive gold exports due to a different gold-
silver ratio from that operating outside, rapid inflation stimulated by the pressures of 
export demand, civil war and heavy government expenditure, a devolved fiscal 
system that limited the income available to the new central regime, were all problems 
that could only be resolved by dismantling the old political institutions pivotal to the 
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associated with major financial and fiscal problems.  Attempts at currency 
stabilisation proved uncertain and often abortive. 
While it was widely recognised that a new financial system and new kinds of 
institutions were necessary to stabilise the economy and support Japan’s international 
economic integration, the environment surrounding the first attempts at reform in the 
1870s was not obviously conducive to success. Efforts to establish a Western style 
banking system and achieve currency reform both demonstrate how easy it was to 
take a misguided decision.  As early as 1872 the government sought to facilitate the 
development of currency-issuing national banks modelled on the United States, but 
the initiative took several years to get off the ground, and even then those national 
banks that appeared remained highly dependent on government funding.  If anything, 
the national bank system exacerbated the inflationary situation, and in the early 1880s 
the whole system was abandoned in favour of a completely different set-up with a 
central bank with sole right of note issue.  The Bank of Japan was established in 1882, 
and under new banking regulations in 1890 all other banks became ordinary banks.  
National banks had all disappeared by the turn of the century.  The process of 
achieving a coordinated nationwide banking system that could provide a firm 
foundation for economic growth and fiscal stability had therefore taken thirty years 
(Tamaki 1995). 
  Provision of a stable and internationally accepted currency took equally as 
long, and was similarly contingent on national political unity.  The identified need 
was for a unitary currency to replace the multiple coins and notes issued by local 
authorities and the commercial elite for transactions in the Tokugawa period.  While 
the new government from early on issued coins and inconvertible paper currency, it 
was only from 1872, with the consolidation of central control through the abolition of 
the old feudal domains, that the new national currency, the yen, was established.  The 
yen operated on a de facto silver standard, but, as noted above, inflation remained an 
ongoing problem.  In 1878 came the formal adoption of bimetallism, with silver 
confirmed as the main medium of circulation, but it was not until the introduction of a 
stringent policy of deflation in the early 1880s under Finance Minister Matsukata 
Masayoshi that inflation was brought under control.  The establishment of the central 
bank system was critical to this domestic stabilisation, but more was required to 
inspire international confidence.  The aspirations of the Meiji authorities extended 
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standard, the internationally recognised ‘Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval’ 
(Eichengreen ?).  The extent to which going on the gold standard was crucial for any 
inflow of foreign capital into Japan is debateable (see eg. Yafeh 2001), but there is no 
doubt that the symbolic significance of putting the yen on the gold standard was 
enormous.  Going on gold was perceived as showing that Japan had become a full 
member of the Western-dominated club (Hunter 2003).  Aspirations, however, were 
not easily translated into reality in a capital-scarce economy.  That Japan accumulated 
sufficient gold reserves to peg the currency to gold in 1897 was in large part due to 
China’s payment of a large gold indemnity in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894-5.  The achievement of international monetary respectability, too, had taken 
around thirty years. 
One other aspect of the development of Japanese banking currently under 
particular scrutiny is the role of commercial banks as lenders to private enterprise.  In 
some respects this particular role of financial institutions does have Meiji roots.  The 
period witnessed the emergence of a range of financial institutions geared to the 
provision of scarce capital to the private and public sector.  These included the so-
called special banks set up by government to achieve specific objectives, such as the 
Yokohama Specie Bank, set up around 1880 to finance foreign trade, the Hypothec 
Bank, whose purpose was to make long term loans to the industrial and agricultural 
sectors, and the Industrial Bank of Japan.  Their activities were supported by other 
government financial institutions, such as the Post Office Savings system, and the 
colonial development banks.  Local private banks also appeared which over time 
played a significant role in lending to local economies, while large commercial banks, 
often under zaibatsu control, helped to fund associated enterprises.  However, 
although state and private sector financial institutions of this kind did play a role in 
Meiji Japan in funding new enterprises, it was a very minor role compared to that 
which evolved later.  While it is clear that post office savings or local banks were 
effective vehicles for the pooling and mobilisation of small savings, and that the 
government could be the key to large scale investment, most capital was raised 
through personal contacts, informal networks or through the often speculative stock 
exchanges.  Reinvestment of profits and private wealth of individuals and families 
was the major source of capital.  Not until the interwar years did the big zaibatsu 
banks really consolidate their role as key players in the financial market, when their 
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firms under the zaibatsu aegis. 
Unlike currency and banking reform, the emergence of the institutions of 
capital provision in Meiji Japan was neither a necessary consequence of the unequal 
treaty system, nor even a requirement of stabilising international economic 
transactions.  It was never a question of making a specific choice between available 
institutional models.  More than anything else the appearance of institutions of this 
kind was a function of late development, the consequence of a response by both 
government and private sector to the constraints imposed by late industrialisation and 
the desire to achieve rapid economic development.  The significance of this 
imperative was equally important in the development of the institutions of business, 
which will be discussed in the next section.  
 
Business Institutions 
The development of new ways of business organisation and operation during 
the Meiji period was something in which the central and local authorities had a far 
more limited involvement.  Certainly the Tokugawa regime and domain authorities 
had been concerned to maintain a degree of control over business activity, but the 
actual forms of business organisation, as well as the attitude to commercial activity, 
were dictated by factors such as the technology of production and the prevailing 
modes of social convention and interaction.  The social appraisal of commercial 
activity and profitmaking was a relatively negative one, as members of the merchant 
class had been designated as the lowest of the four main strata of Tokugawa society.  
While the commercial elite had in many cases achieved considerable economic 
power, this was not necessarily reflected in enhanced social status or political 
influence.  The predominance of the family business, for example, was closely related 
to the emphasis on the family as the pivotal unit in society, the limited means of 
pooling capital in the relative absence of reliable financial intermediaries, and the 
limited geographical range of most economic activities.  In this Japan was no different 
from many other pre-industrial economies.  However, while these forms of 
organisation had offered many strengths, they also posed limitations in the changed 
economic context of the late nineteenth century.  Capital requirements were 
considerably greater for new manufacturing enterprises, while technological 
knowhow and information to deal with international markets were in scarce supply. 
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Popular perceptions could not be changed overnight, and the government did not see 
it as its responsibility to intervene in the organisation of private firms.  While pilot 
factories might be appropriate for technology transfer, state-owned firms could not 
necessarily offer an organisational model for the private sector.  There are two 
respects, perhaps, in which the government did seek to facilitate change and 
adaptation in this area.  One was in its collusion in what might be called the ‘myth’ of 
the ‘unique’ nationalist entrepreneur.  Recognising the need to rehabilitate the validity 
of economic activity as a national project, a recognition reinforced by the growing 
overt involvement in economic activity of former members of the elite samurai class, 
the state not only sought to give positive encouragement to specific initiatives, but 
also employed a powerful rhetoric to stress the extent to which entrepreneurship, 
investment and profitmaking were just as valid expressions of nationalism and 
patriotism as political or military service.  It was business leaders themselves who 
were the most powerful advocates of this view, but they were able to count on 
government support in articulating it. 
This concept of the ‘nationalist’ entrepreneur was taken up by a number of 
economic historians of Japan (eg. Ranis 1954; Hirschmeier 1964), and at one point 
was even considered one of the keys to the supposed ‘unique’ pattern of Japanese 
development.  The extent to which the Meiji commercial elite was driven by 
nationalism rather than the hope of profits has, not surprisingly, been questioned (eg. 
Yamamura 1974), but what is important here is that this exercise in rhetoric and 
persuasion was a powerful tool in changing institutions in North’s sense of informal 
rules governed by mental models.  It demonstrates the strength of ideology as well as 
the ability of the ruling elite in Japan at this time, including the state, to exercise a 
major influence over hearts and minds in a process of ‘institutional learning’.  Recent 
work has suggested that the post-Pacific War Japanese state retained a considerable 
expertise in moral suasion (Garon 1997), and we perhaps need to ask how far that 
ability still rests with the Japanese authorities, should they seek to utilise it. 
The second key area of government involvement lay in establishing the legal 
framework for the operation of a modern company system.  While the first joint stock 
companies predated legislation, it was only when such legislation was established that 
they could become the widespread norm in company formation.  Legal infrastructure 
allowing for financial institutions such as banks and stock exchanges, much of it 
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However, as Fruin has shown, the specific ways in which firms and factories came to 
be organised were very much a response to the particular Japanese environment and 
the imperatives of late development.  Entrepreneurs needed in particular to address 
the need to address the scarcity of the various resources required for the growth of an 
internationally competitive manufacturing sector, notably capital, knowledge and 
information (Fruin 1992).  The best example of this response is perhaps to be found in 
the emergence of the zaibatsu, the great conglomerates that played a critical role in 
Japan’s early industrialisation and reached their apogee in the interwar years.  Usually 
family-owned, these concerns were held together by finance rather than any 
technological or organic interconnectedness.  By internalising their needs for scarce 
resources, they were increasingly able to achieve substantial economies of scope and 
reduce transactions costs to a level far lower than normally achievable in late 
industrialising economies.  Family networks allowed for an initial pooling of capital, 
later supported by the evolution of powerful in-house banks, while possession of a 
single trading corporation within the group allowed for a focussed development of 
knowledge about dealing with external markets.  These organisations too, though, 
were strongly embedded in accepted social practice, that is, in pre-existing 
institutions.  Constituent companies were held together not just by economic means 
such as cross-shareholding, but also by mechanisms such as strategic marriages and 
regular personal meetings (Morikawa 1993).  In fact, much of the Japanese economy 
remained dominated by pre-existing forms of business organisation. Small and 
medium firms, invariably owned by families and working mainly with family labour, 
continued to account for a high proportion of all enterprises.  By the end of the Meiji 
period, over forty years after the initial commitment to change was publicly made, 
only a minute proportion of all enterprises had taken on even a modified Western 
form of corporate governance.  The picture is thus a complex one, in which imported 
institutions only slowly made inroads into the traditional modes of operation, and 
even those imported institutions could only be of use in a context of adaptation. 
 
Change in the Labour Market 
 Meiji period changes in the labour market and employee-employer relations 
take on a renewed topicality in the light of current discussion about the need to 
accelerate changes in Japanese employment practices.  Again the picture is a highly 
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enterprises.  It is clear, however, that the need to respond to the demands of 
mechanised factory production, and the employment within a single entity of labour 
on a larger scale than even the biggest ‘manufactories’ of the late Tokugawa period 
required new modes of labour organisation.  In principle the government throughout 
this period maintained a hands-off approach to the institutions of labour management, 
although concern over the effects of deleterious working conditions in factories did 
eventually lead the authorities to intervene to change the rules of the game in the 
labour market, in particular through pushing through protective legislation in the form 
of the first Factory Act right at the end of the Meiji period in 1910.  Up until then 
large employers had consistently resisted what they saw as encroachment on their 
rights as employers. 
This strong resistance did not mean that the process of change in labour and 
employment relations was a smooth or rapid one.  Historical evidence suggests quite 
the opposite.  Many early employers complained about the ‘confused’ state of 
employment relations consequent on the demise of the old employment and 
apprenticeship system, and even called for its reinstatement.  Concerns about the 
unreliability, mobility and low quality of all workers were widespread, giving rise to 
fears of the potential for anomie and social upheaval inherent in the transition from 
the old to the new.  The clash between the political and economic elite advocating 
change and the extent of social inertia that they often felt that they faced is well 
summed up in comments made by factory owners, who in the 1890s considered their 
workers as a race apart, benighted by barbarity, ignorance and idleness.  The task of 
‘educating’ the mass of the Japanese population in new ways of doing things was for 
this group at least a very real one.  Overt conflict between factory employers and 
employees was recurrent through much of the Meiji period, taking forms that ranged 
from strikes and violence through to absenteeism and absconding.  That the majority 
of employers were reluctant to countenance any external imposition of a clearly 
defined set of rules would seem to have been largely due to a reluctance to accept that 
inherent in regulation was the principle of mutuality of rights and obligations.  The 
principle of mutual obligations between different groups in society had been widely 
accepted in earlier times, although the existence of hierarchy or patriarchy, and the 
actual allocation of power, might often act to distort and conceal the principle of 
mutuality.   However, whereas Tokugawa employer-employee relations had also 
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Meiji employers suggest that what they sought was a relationship in which the 
employer had the rights and the employee the obligations.  Any legislation aimed at 
protecting the welfare of the workforce, and hence constraining the absolute authority 
of the employer, was strongly contested on the grounds that Western-style labour 
legislation was unnecessary in Japan, which was following its own development path 
in which the interests of both employers and employees were guaranteed by the 
utopian paternalistic, familial way in which enterprises were organised and managed.  
More cogent, perhaps, was the argument that such were the economic pressures on 
Japan’s infant industries that changing the institutions of the labour market was an 
expensive luxury that neither state nor entrepreneurs could afford (Hunter 2003). 
There are examples of employers themselves seeking to address the problems 
of transition in the labour market through collective action.  In the textile industries, 
for example, employers tried to regulate the movement of labour between enterprises 
by adherence to an agreed set of practices which in many ways tried to deal with 
labour as it were an inanimate commodity that could be bought or sold.  Scholars who 
have looked at these attempts to influence labour market institutions are disagreed as 
to their effects (eg. Tōjō 1992?; Kanbayashi 2001; Nakabayashi 2001), but we can be 
sure that rapid economic expansion, and agency and enforcement problems invariably 
rendered these attempts less than fully effective.  If we look at labour market 
institutions, therefore, the picture from the Meiji period is one of a considerable 
degree of continuity in large parts of the economy, and enormous upheaval in the 
sectors that were spearheading economic change, characterised by an absence of both 
formal and informal rules.  Even by the end of the Meiji period most large employers, 
whether in the commercial or manufacturing sectors, were far from achieving a stable 
and widely accepted pattern of employment practices (Gordon 1984).  A situation 
more different from the ‘Japanese employment system’ of the second half of the 
twentieth century is hard to imagine.  Rhetoric and the recreation of tradition may 
well have been a powerful tool in linking this famed system to its Meiji and pre-Meiji 
heritage, but its reality can be dated back at the very earliest to the 1920s, with the 
sporadic appearance of some of its constituent elements in response to the constraints 
of labour supply faced by some enterprises. 
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It is not easy to draw out any implications that an analysis of late nineteenth 
century changes may have for Japan’s current dilemmas.  It has been emphasised here 
that there existed no single coherent pattern of institutional and organisational change 
in Meiji Japan.  Change was a highly complex and patchy process, which in many 
cases took decades rather than years.  The extent to which organisational or legislative 
change was able to lead institutional change in the Northian sense was at best 
unpredictable.  The ability of the political and economic leaders to engineer and 
accelerate reform was often limited, and it was often the pragmatic response to the 
imperatives of late development that was a more powerful force for change than 
sophisticated debates or the presence of viable foreign models.  Japan is clearly no 
longer ‘relatively backward’, and the catch-up imperative has ceased to obtain.  A 
number of tentative conclusions may, however, be offered. 
Firstly, the major stimulus driving institutional change in the Meiji period was 
an awareness of national crisis and overriding threat reflected in the ability of the 
Western powers to impose on the international autonomy of Japan.  Awareness of this 
threat was initially restricted to the ruling elite, but the effective manipulation of 
nationalist sentiment was a powerful tool in building and sustaining any momentum 
for change.  It is for others to judge how far that particular tool for articulating a 
unified national response is still a viable one, but it is apparent that the sense of 
urgency that might be applied to the cause of reform has remained muted, perhaps 
because of the cushion offered by Japan’s reserves of wealth. 
A second factor relates to the issue of political will.  It is apparent that despite 
its problems the Meiji government possessed both the desire and ability to override 
and dismantle vested interests when it took the view that it was essential to do so.  
The abolition of the old domain system and the pensioning off of the former ruling 
warrior class was achieved within a decade of the Restoration, albeit at considerable 
political and economic cost.  Whether or not this is interpreted as a process of 
breaking down institutional sclerosis (Olson 1982), it does point to the presence of 
that rather nebulous entity, political leadership.  The Meiji period demonstrates the 
significance of political decision-making and political resolution in promoting 
institutional change, and also in not impeding it. 
The complex picture that emerges of institutional change in the Meiji period 
suggests not only that it is unrealistic to expect fundamental institutional change 
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institutional borrowing and institutional choice, there has to be accommodation with 
the existing institutional cluster or clusters.  It is this that renders institutional change 
as process rather than event.  It also means that the extent of institutional change that 
has taken place may only become apparent over a sustained course of time. 
The Meiji period also suggests that the relative merits of importing institutions 
and modifying existing ones vary according to each specific case.  It may be that 
institutional transfer can signal a desire to embark on a completely new trajectory, but 
it can also be risky and just as time-consuming as efforts to grope for a new system 
based purely on what already exists.  With appropriate modifications borrowed 
institutions can over time be made to work, but they can also be so unsuited to the 
receiving environment that appropriate adaptation is impossible. As in the case of 
technology transfer, a successful process of institutional learning in Johnson’s sense is 
related not just to economic and political needs, but to social capability more broadly.  
Where ‘culture’ is regarded as impeding institutional change, we also need to ask 
whether it is the way that culture is constructed that is the real obstacle, rather than the 
culture itself. 
Compared with the Meiji period, what happens in Japan’s economy now is of 
critical importance well beyond Japan’s borders, and yet the process of globalisation 
may in some ways have made it more difficult even for wealthy countries to 
implement the safety net required to protect the most vulnerable losers of the process 
of institutional and organisational change (Rodrik 1997).  The dilemma that faces 
would-be reformers in Japan is also more intangible.  The tenet of Western 
technology and Eastern spirit embraced a recognition that in practical terms Japan had 
a great deal to learn, but that it was possible even in this context to retain a degree of 
confidence and belief in the Japanese intellectual and social tradition.  While that 
confidence and belief was often distorted and mis-used in subsequent decades, it 
supported the existence of an ongoing self-respect in relation to Japan’s position in 
the world, shaken but not destroyed by defeat in the Pacific War.  Contemporary 
Japan is the world’s technological leader, but it has not seized the international 
ascendancy commensurate with its enormous economic power.  It is the need to 
respond to pressure to combine Japanese technology with a Western spirit that is the 
greatest challenge for institutional change in Japan. 
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